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Abstract We examine the impact of interpersonal justice among outside directors
on the board and between a director and the CEO regarding the director’s moni-
toring and resource provision behaviors in different cultural contexts. We argue that
directors from individualistic countries are more influenced by CEO interpersonal
justice while directors from collectivistic countries are more affected by the board
interpersonal justice. Our main effect results indicate that interpersonal justice with
board members is positively related to both monitoring and resource provision by a
director, while CEO interpersonal justice is related only to resource provision. Our
results also show different effects on the director’s behaviors between three coun-
tries, i.e., Canada, Singapore, and Spain. We found that CEO interpersonal justice is
positively associated with resource provision in Canada, while board interpersonal
justice is positively related to both monitoring and resource provision in Singapore
and Spain. These results suggest that directors discharge their board duties differ-
ently by how they are treated by other directors and the CEO and that their gov-
ernance behaviors vary by culture. This study contributes to the literature on
comparative corporate governance by showing the differences in directors’
behaviors in different cultural contexts.
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1 Introduction
Directors of the board play both monitoring and resource provision roles as they
fulfill their duties (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Sundaramaurthy and Lewis 2003;
Westphal 1999). Board members have the responsibility to monitor management on
behalf of shareholders and other stakeholders (Fama 1980), and they also provide
resources, such as skills, expertise, and connections to other organizations, to
enhance organizational or firm performance (Carpenter and Westphal 2001; Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978). Indeed, extant research on corporate governance often focuses
on these roles and functions of the board. This is an important issue because what
board members do can have a profound impact on organizational performance and
strategic directions. Therefore, what factors influence board members’ behaviors in
the boardroom is a critical issue not only to researchers but also to practitioners.
The majority of corporate governance research thus far has been influenced by
agency theory, which focuses on the board’s monitoring function. In the agency
theory framework, it is assumed that the CEO may act opportunistically to seek his
or her personal interests and there is a conflict of interests between the CEO and
shareholders or other stakeholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling
1976). Directors, especially independent outsiders which are the main focus of our
study, are therefore expected to monitor the CEO. But this theoretical perspective
does not take into consideration interpersonal relationships among directors as well
as between the CEO and directors (Cohen et al. 2012; Eisenhardt 1989).
Another important issue in research on the board of directors (and corporate
governance in general) is the rising awareness that contexts in which the board is
embedded affect how the board functions (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Peng 2004;
Van Essen et al. 2012; Yoshikawa et al. 2014) and how social factors affect the
board’s performance (Gillette et al. 2008; Yoshikawa and Hu 2016). Prior studies on
the relationship between the board, especially the presence of outside directors, and
firm performance show only mixed results (e.g., Dalton et al. 1998; Finkelstein and
D’Aveni 1994; Peng 2004). It is possible that such findings may be due to the fact
that the cultural contexts in which the boards are embedded are neglected. Indeed,
prior research indicates that national culture affects governance and management
practices within an organization (Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Tosi and Greckhamer
2004) and also a nation’s governance system (Buck and Shahrim 2005; Licht et al.
2005). We contend that national culture also matters to governance practices at the
individual level including individual directors’ governance behaviors, just like
CEOs’ leadership style is influenced by culture (Child 1981).
This study thus aims to contribute to comparative corporate governance research
by comparing individual outside directors’ behaviors in three different countries with
varying cultural characteristics, i.e., Canada, Singapore, and Spain. Prior research
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(e.g., Westphal and Stern 2006; Westphal and Zajac 1997) suggests that the
interpersonal relationships or social ties between the CEO and outside directors have
important implications on how the directors play their governance roles. For example,
one study shows that directors’ perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness affect their
governance behaviors (Del Brio et al. 2013). Indeed, a behavioral perspective of
corporate governance is gaining increasing attention among governance researchers
(Garg and Eisenhardt 2016; Westphal and Zajac 2013). We incorporate this
perspective to investigate the effects of one of the key interpersonal factors, justice,
which is broadly defined as fairness perceptions (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001;
Whitman et al. 2012) in the three countries. Specifically, we investigate individual
outside directors’ boardroom behaviors from a relational perspective by focusing on
interpersonal justice among the different dimensions of justice such as distributive
and procedural justice. We chose to focus on interpersonal justice because this is one
of the main factors that influence individual behaviors in interpersonal relationships
based on research in organizational behavior (Cropanzano et al. 2011; Ferris et al.
2012; Lavelle et al. 2007) and prior research shows that culture affects the effects of
justice on outcomes related to supervisor-employee relationships (Shao et al. 2013).
We consider interpersonal relationships between directors and CEO and among
directors as a social exchange (Camerman et al. 2007; Lavelle et al. 2007) and
examine how a director’s perceptions of interpersonal justice affect his or her decision
to provide resources to and monitor the CEO.
We chose these three countries because board members face a somewhat similar
ownership pattern of concentration by family, corporate, or state owners (La Porta
et al. 1999), which likely affects how the board functions differently from other
countries with dispersed ownership such as the U.S. (Van Essen et al. 2012;
Yoshikawa et al. 2014). Yet, these countries exhibit quite different patterns in the
cultural dimensions that are highly relevant to interpersonal relationships and group
(board) dynamics. This study specifically focuses on the individualism/collectivism
dimension, because it is one of the most highly used dimensions in cross-cultural
studies, especially between East Asians and North Americans (Li and Cropanzano
2009). Canadian culture is characterized as highly individualistic, while Singapore
represents strong collectivistic culture. Spanish culture in this dimension is
characterized as in between these two countries. It is not as individualistic as Canada
as typical in the Latin cultures, although it shares the Western culture (Hofstede
2011). Spanish culture is also characterized by strong family values and emphasis on
social and group norms (Greenwood et al. 2010; Triandis 1989), which is similar to
the East Asian culture. We examine how these differences in the individualism/col-
lectivism dimension influence the effects of interpersonal justice with other board
members and with the CEO on directors’ behaviors in the boardroom.
Our findings show that while board interpersonal justice is positively related to both
monitoring and resource provision by directors, CEO interpersonal justice is positively
related to resource provision. There is also evidence on a non-linear relationship
between CEO interpersonal justice and monitoring; negative at low levels and turning
to positive at very high levels of CEO interpersonal justice. The empirical results
largely support our predictions on cross-cultural differences; board interpersonal justice
matters more to collectivists while CEO interpersonal justice has stronger impact on
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individualists. We found that CEO interpersonal justice is more positively associated
with resource provision for directors in Canada, while board interpersonal justice is
more positively related to both monitoring and resource provision for directors in
Singapore and Spain. Thus, our empirical results are consistent with theory on justice
and different cross-cultural effects on human behavior.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review directors’ monitoring and
resource provision functions. Second, we review social exchange theory and the
concept of justice, and develop hypotheses on the main effects of interpersonal
justice. We then present the moderating effects of culture on the main effects. We
present the method and empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of our
results, contributions of this study, limitations and agenda for future research.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Directors’ boardroom behaviors
Directors of the board typically play two different roles: monitoring and advisory or
resource provision (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Hillman
et al. 2008). Monitoring is emphasized in the agency theory literature, which is
predicated on the assumption that managers may act opportunistically to pursue
their own self interests. The monitoring role includes assessing CEO’s performance,
monitoring strategy implementation, designing the CEO compensation schemes,
and CEO succession planning (Boyd 1995). Prior research in the agency theory
perspective often investigates how monitoring by the board and shareholders
mitigates the agency problem and thereby improves firm performance or leads to
managerial decisions that benefit shareholders.
On the other hand, much of the extant literature in resource dependence theory
has focused on how directors’ expertise, knowledge, and skills as well as their ties to
external organizations affect organizational performance (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Johnson et al. (2013) argue that such human
and relational capital is the antecedent of the directors’ resource provision activities.
In this role, the board provides advice and counselling, information channels with
external organizations, access to external resources, and legitimacy (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Researchers have now begun to consider the directors’ resource
provision and incentive issues concurrently, by integrating agency and resource
dependence theories (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Zhu and Yoshikawa 2016). We
build on this research by considering the board members’ perceptions about how
they are treated by the CEO and other directors.
2.2 Social exchange theory and interpersonal justice
Interpersonal interactions in organizations are generally governed by an unspoken
social exchange between individuals (Blau 1964; Cohen et al. 2012; Homans 1958).
Positive relationships are often based on norms of reciprocity and unspoken
exchange of trust, honesty, and support (Buller and Burgoon 1996). Essentially, a
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board member who voluntarily engages in positive behavior towards another
individual (i.e., the CEO) will lead to a similar but unspecified reciprocal behavior.
The nature of the exchanges may expand over time, as obligations are discharged
and new ones are created, and as trust between the parties builds. Prior research
indeed suggests that directors’ perceptions of the CEO’s trustworthiness affect their
governance behaviors (Del Brio et al. 2013). Thus, we suggest that social exchange
theory (Blau 1964) can be used to explain the complex interpersonal interactions of
corporate directors and their CEO.
Social exchange theory explains that people ‘‘enter into new social associations
because they expect doing so to be rewarding and that they continue relations with old
associates and expand their interaction with them because they actually find doing so
to be rewarding’’ (Blau 1968: 452). The ‘‘rewards,’’ in this case, are not limited to
material or financial resources, but can also include psychological or socio-emotional
needs. Social exchange relationships often entail emotional attachments and a sense
of loyalty between exchange partners (Masterson et al. 2000). In the context of
corporate governance, board members may provide greater assistance to the CEO
when they believe that their contributions are reciprocated in the form of emotional
and psychological support, endorsement of their reappointment (if the CEO has an
influence on such a decision), or friendship. Directors may also be discouraged to
engage in monitoring as part of their duties when they have an affective relationship
with the CEO, who treats them with respect, dignity, and care.
In interpersonal relationships in the workplace, prior research shows that justice plays
an important role in shaping employees’ behaviors such as commitment, task
performance, and organization citizenship behavior (Chiaburu and Lim 2008;
Cropanzano et al. 2002). In the organizational behavior literature, it is suggested that
justice has four distinct dimensions, i.e., distributive, procedural, informational, and
interpersonal (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001). Distributive justice is defined as the
fairness perceptions about the outcomes, while procedural justice is related to the
fairness perceptions about the decision process that leads to such outcomes (Cropanzano
et al. 2001). Information justice refers to the fairness perceptions of the information
provided in the implementation of a procedure, while interpersonal justice can be
defined as the degree to which individuals are treated with respect and dignity by those
who are in the decision-making positions (Cropanzano et al. 2001; Greenberg 1993).
In this study, we focus on interpersonal justice because our objective is to
investigate the effects of the interpersonal factors on directors’ behaviors.
Interpersonal justice is considered as one aspect of interactional justice which
includes both information justice and interpersonal justice discussed above (Bies
and Moag 1986). However, as it has been found that these two aspects have
independent effects, other studies often use information justice and interpersonal
justice separately (Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1993). Prior research found that
interpersonal justice includes such criteria in the survey used by Bies and Moag
(1986) as respect (e.g., being polite) and propriety (e.g., not making improper
remarks and statements) (Greenberg 1993). We follow the definition of interper-
sonal justice used in those prior studies.
Recently, researchers argue that targets of people’s behaviors may be multifoci,
depending upon the source of justice (Lavelle et al. 2007; Rupp and Cropanzano
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2002). For example, the sources of justice can be the organization, one’s supervisor,
and one’s coworkers and peers. This suggests that the social exchange process can
also be multifoci and therefore, we need to specify the sources of justice to examine
individuals’ behaviors in order to deepen our understanding of the effects of justice.
This multifoci nature of justice also applies to board members’ fairness or
interpersonal justice perceptions as well.
In the context of the board, the sources of interpersonal justice for board
members can be other directors on the same board and the CEO. Here, we contend
that the influence of a CEO is qualitatively different from that of other board
members even when the CEO is also a board chair as often seen in some contexts
such as the U.S. For a director of the board, other board members are essentially his
or her peers or coworkers and also members of the same group or team. However,
the CEO is the target individual whom board members are supposed to monitor as
well as to support through advice and counselling. When a director perceives that
other board members treat him or her with politeness, respect and dignity, which are
key criteria of interpersonal justice (Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1993), then it is likely
that the director’s commitment to and identification with the board will be enhanced
(Hillman et al. 2008; Lavelle et al. 2007), which in turn will likely lead to enhanced
commitment to the board duties. Polite and respectful treatment by other board
members will enhance a director’s self-esteem, the sense of emotional attachment or
belonging to the group, and trust in the group, which in turn has a positive impact on
the director’s motivation. Therefore, we predict that board interpersonal justice will
have positive effects on the director’s monitoring and resource provision activities.
Hence,
H1a Board interpersonal justice is positively related to a director’s monitoring.
H1b Board interpersonal justice is positively related to a director’s resource
provision.
When the source of justice is the CEO, the director’s behaviors are directed
toward the CEO because a social exchange relationship is established between an
individual director and the CEO (Camerman et al. 2007; Cropanzano et al. 2002).
From a social exchange perspective, CEO interpersonal justice will likely motivate
a director to engage in behaviors that are helpful to the CEO. Further, the director
will be motivated to diligently fulfill his or her board duties, which often include
providing advice and counselling as a response to the CEO’s respectful treatment of
the director. Therefore, we expect that the director will be more inclined to provide
his or her resources to the CEO who treats the director with respect and dignity.
Effectively, the director’s resource provision is a reciprocal behavior in response to
the CEO’s interpersonal justice behavior.
The effect of the CEO’s interpersonal justice on the director’s monitoring,
however, requires more careful thought. It may be argued that the director who is
treated with respect, fairness, and dignity by the CEO may be motivated to engage
in his or her monitoring duty more diligently out of respect to the CEO who exhibits
interpersonal justice behavior. The director may feel that lowering his or her effort
to engage in managerial monitoring can lead him or her to lose the CEO’s respect.
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In other words, the director’s monitoring activity may be perceived as a reciprocal
social exchange behavior to the CEO’s respectful treatment of the director.
Based on the social exchange rationale, however, one can argue that the director
would be discouraged from engaging in strong monitoring of the CEO that may
create social distance and strain the relationship between the director and the CEO
(Gulati and Westphal 1999; Westphal and Zajac 2013), especially as it is generally
assumed that the CEO does not like to be monitored intensely by the board (Walsh
and Seward 1990). Hence, one could argue that the director will reciprocate by
lowering his or her monitoring intensity to the CEO’s interpersonal justice behavior
toward the director. Further, the director may develop greater trust in the CEO who
exhibits greater interpersonal justice (Lavelle et al. 2007), which in turn leads the
director to reduce his or her monitoring intensity as trust and monitoring can be
substitutes (Langfred 2004: McEvily et al. 2003).
H2a CEO interpersonal justice is positively related to a director’s resource
provision.
H2b CEO interpersonal justice is negatively related to a director’s monitoring.
2.3 Cross-cultural differences
We predict that interpersonal justice, both with the board and the CEO, will have
important effects on monitoring and resource provision by a director. However, we
expect that the effects of interpersonal justice with other board members and the
CEO will vary by country due to cultural differences. Prior research shows that
national culture influences corporate governance practices within an organization
(Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Tosi and Greckhamer 2004) and also a nation’s
governance system (Buck and Shahrim 2005; Daniel et al. 2012; Licht et al. 2005).
In our view, national culture is at least equally important to governance practices at
the individual director level as the directors are also embedded in the cultural
context of each country. Indeed, it is suggested that culture influences CEOs’
leadership style (Child 1981). Then, it is reasonable to expect that individual
directors’ behaviors, especially the impact of interpersonal factors on those
behaviors, would also be influenced by national culture.
We focus on one cultural dimension proposed by Hofstede (1997), i.e.,
individualism/collectivism. While there are several other models that distinguish
culture (e.g., Inglehart et al. 2004; House et al. 2004—which will also be used for
the sake of robustness), we cannot clearly argue which model is superior to others
for what types of study. Even though Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are criticized
by some researchers (Brett and Okumura 1998; Schwartz 1994), more recent
research claims that the measures are still relevant. Drogendijk and Slangen (2006),
for example, find in their study of Dutch MNEs that the Hofstede- and Schwartz-
based measures have comparable explanatory power. There is also a suggestion that
Schwartz’s measures may be more appropriate than Hofstede’s measures in non-
work related contexts (Ng et al. 2007). Further, much prior research on justice use
the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (see Shao et al. 2013 for review of research on
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employee justice). Hence, this study adopts primarily Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions.
We choose to focus on the individualism/collectivism dimension because the
effects of other cultural dimensions are likely to be contingent upon other board-
level and individual director-level factors or they capture similar aspects in
individualism/collectivism that may influence directors’ behaviors. In addition, the
cultural frameworks proposed by Hofstede (1997), Schwartz (1994), and House
et al. (2004) include only a set of selected cultural dimensions and do not
comprehensively capture all relevant aspects of national culture. Indeed, some of the
dimensions in one framework are highly correlated with other dimensions in other
frameworks. In the case of individualism in Hofstede’s model, it is negatively
correlated with ‘‘conservatism’’ and positively with ‘‘affective autonomy’’ in
Schwartz’s model. Hence, the individualism/collectivism dimension likely captures
several cultural dimensions in different models.
Among the dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1997), power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, and feminism/masculinity can possibly influence the directors’ behaviors.
Power distance, defined as the degrees to which differences in power and status are
accepted (Hofstede 1997), creates a hierarchy among directors on the board based on
such factors as age, board tenure, and status in another organization. The presence of
high power distance, which often creates an informal hierarchy, can thus promote
directors’ deference to other directors and the CEO (He and Huang 2011). However,
its impact may vary between the high status directors and the low status directors as
well as the relative status of the CEO. For example, the high status directors may take
other board members’ interpersonal justice behavior for granted and therefore, they
are not likely to be much influenced by respect shown by other board members. But
the low status directors may react positively to such treatment. As for the CEO
interpersonal justice, the low status directors likely respond positively because they
may regard the CEO as a higher status individual and thus avoid intense monitoring
and engage in resource provision more intensely. However, the high status directors
likely behave differently. Hence, it is expected that the impact of power distance
varies by the status of each board member and of the CEO.
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the degree to which people prefer rules and
conformity and the extent to which people are uncomfortable with high risk and
ambiguity (Hofstede 1997). High uncertainty avoidance in the board or group
context means that group members have a tendency to avoid conflict with other
members by following rules and norms (Tosi and Greckhamer 2004). The effects of
the degree of uncertainty avoidance are, however, likely to be similar to those of
individualism/collectivism where people in more collectivistic societies tend to
emphasize their group’s interests and aim to preserve group harmony. Lastly,
feminism/masculinity, which indicates the degree of gender role distinction
(Hofstede 1997), can potentially impact directors’ behavior (Ahern and Dittmar
2012; Matsa and Miller 2013), e.g., when there are some female directors in an
institutional context characterized by high masculinity. However, our study does not
focus on gender diversity on the board, as it is beyond the scope of this study.
Hence, adding these cultural dimensions to the model does not likely increase value
of the study or is not appropriate in addressing our research questions.
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2.4 Cultural effects on the impact of board interpersonal justice
We expect that these differences may arise because directors from countries that are
more collectivistic or individualistic will react differently to interpersonal justice when
the source of such justice is different; the source of interpersonal justice with other board
members is the board itself or group, while the source of the CEO interpersonal justice is
another individual. Li and Cropanzano (2009) find in their meta-analysis that the effects
of justice (distributive and procedural justice in their study) on such outcomes as
affective organizational commitment and turnover intensions tend to be greater among
North Americans than among East Asians. They theorize that North Americans who are
more individualistic than East Asians emphasize personal self-concept and the
promotion of personal goals (Markus and Kitayama 1991) and thus injustice that may
prevent the achievement of their personal goals provokes a strong reaction. East Asians,
on the other hand, are more collectivistic and hence have stronger collective or relational
self-concept than North Americans.
While Li and Cropanzano (2009) show that the effects of distributive and
procedural justice are stronger among North Americans than among East Asians, it
is likely that the effects of interpersonal justice with group members or peers have
different patterns. As discussed, individuals from collectivist societies tend to
emphasize relational or collective self-concept, group and social norms, and group
duty (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1989). This implies that how they are
treated by other members will likely have an important impact on their behaviors,
especially compared to those from more individualistic cultures. Unfair treatment
by their group members likely triggers concern about their long-term relationship
with the group (Brockner et al. 1992), and fair treatment by group members may
enhance their commitment to and motivation to work for the group. This suggests
that interpersonal justice by other board members will likely have a positive effect
on a director’s governance behaviors in Singapore and Spain.
On the other hand, while it is still important to individuals from more
individualistic cultures to be treated with respect and politeness by their group
members, interpersonal justice from group members may have a weaker effect
because of their strong self-concept rather than relational or collective self-concept
and their emphasis on specific individual interactions. This is because the
achievement of their personal goals is more important than the positive evaluation
by their group members for individuals from individualistic cultures (Markus and
Kitayama 1991). Thus, North Americans or Canadian likely exhibit weaker
reactions to interpersonal (in)justice from group members compared to individuals
from more collectivistic or less individualistic cultures. In short, we predict that the
directors in more individualistic countries will react less strongly to board
interpersonal justice. Hence,
Hypothesis 3a Board interpersonal justice is less strongly associated with a
director’s monitoring in countries with stronger individualism.
Hypothesis 3b Board interpersonal justice is less strongly associated with a
director’s resource provision in countries with stronger individualism.
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2.5 Cultural effects on the impact of CEO interpersonal justice
In terms of CEO interpersonal justice, following the argument on the difference
between individualists and collectivists, we expect that directors in more
individualistic countries are more likely to be affected by interpersonal justice
with the CEO than directors in more collectivistic countries because directors in
individualistic countries will likely react more strongly to (in)justice exhibited by a
specific individual, i.e., the CEO. To directors in individualistic countries, who tend
to emphasize individual interactions due to their individualistic orientation
(Hofstede 1997), how the CEO shows respect, dignity, and care when they interact
with him or her is expected to have a strong influence on their behavior because it
affects their self-concept and self-esteem. The CEO’s interpersonal justice behavior
toward the director affirms that director’s individual worth, which in turn motivates
the director to engage in his or her governance duties, i.e., monitoring and resource
provision. Thus, we predict that interpersonal justice with the CEO will likely affect
the director’s behaviors in the boardroom more strongly in highly individualistic
countries.
The individual interactions, for example with the CEO, are likely relatively less
important to directors in more collectivistic countries compared to those in more
individualistic countries because individuals in collectivistic countries emphasize
the positive evaluation within a group rather than by a specific individual (Markus
and Kitayama 1991). Hence, directors in more collectivistic countries will likely to
be more influenced by how other board members treat him or her rather than by how
the CEO treats him or her. Especially, this is likely to be the case for outside
directors as other outside board members are their fellow group members while the
CEO’s position on the board is clearly different from outside directors (He and
Huang 2011). This suggests that such directors are less likely to be affected by the
CEO’s interpersonal justice when they engage in their governance duties on the
board. Hence, when the source of justice is CEO, we predict that the directors in
more individualistic countries will react more strongly to the CEO interpersonal
justice, either negatively or positively.
Hypothesis 4a CEO interpersonal justice is more strongly and negatively
associated with a director’s monitoring in countries with stronger individualism.
Hypothesis 4b CEO interpersonal justice is more strongly and positively
associated with a director’s resource provision in countries with stronger
individualism.
3 Methods
3.1 Sample and data collection
Our study focuses on three different countries, Spain, Singapore and Canada, among
which important cultural and institutional differences were expected, thus
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enhancing the generalizability of our findings. However, the official responsibilities
of the board do not differ much among the three contexts. Our study focuses on
behaviors of the director as a profession.
To undertake this study, an anonymous survey questionnaire was sent to outside
directors of major organizations (both listed and non-listed organizations) in the
three countries. Formal agreements with some major director associations facilitated
the implementation of the investigation. The associations were in charge of emailing
the survey to their members from October 2009 to March 2010. The survey
consisted of a set of questions which allow us to build the constructors, according to
Colquitt’s (2001) definition of justice. We followed a similar procedure as that
described in Del Brio et al. (2013), although the questions in the survey and the final
sample differ from one paper to the other. Thus, we also included a cover letter
which explained the relevance of the study. After three weeks, we sent a first
reminder, and a second one was sent six weeks later.
The final sample includes 164 outside directors coming from three different
countries: 62 responses from Singapore, 72 responses from Canada (after removing
responses with missing values), and 30 usable responses from Spain (after removing
several respondents due to technical problems). For the Spanish case, 30 responses
were obtained from 300 directors, which represented 10% of the target directors’
population, according to the ICA association. No information on the target
population was obtained either from Canada or Singapore, the reason why we
cannot produce a precise response rate, although we expect it to be under 10%
according to the estimated number of registered directors in those countries.
To quantify the average outside director in our sample, we can indicate that out
of the 72 respondents who indicated their gender, most were male (71%); the
average age of the 92 respondents who indicated it was 56 [comparable figure to that
indicate in previous literature in Singapore (50; Quah 2006), Spain (59; Spencer
Stuart Board Index 2010), and Canada (61; Spencer Stuart Board Index 2008)].
Regarding their academic background, most of our respondents had either Master’s
or undergraduate-level education, from a wide range of functional backgrounds such
as marketing/sales, finance, research and development, engineering, operations, and
law. Finally, the average directors board tenure was 7.8 years, which is slightly over
the average board tenure of directors in Spain and Canada (5 years; Spencer Stuart
Board Index Canada and Spain; 7 years for Singapore). No general information
about the board was incorporated in the survey to avoid a lengthy questionnaire and
because our main focus was on the interpersonal and individual characteristics.
3.2 Survey design
The questions from the questionnaire which are used in the current analysis are
listed in Table 1 below. For the case of Spain, we used Spanish rather than English
to ensure a higher response rate, but we took all the preventions to keep the spirit of
the questions. In fact, the entire questionnaire was carefully designed to prevent an
excessive length as well as item ambiguity (which will exacerbate common method
biases). Actually, we did pretest it to several directors to ensure this aim. The scale
employed was a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
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to agree or disagree with our statements. Once more, we followed Del Brio et al.
(2013; p. 161) procedures to deal with the problem of low response rate (which was
a priori expected as a consequence of the sensitive topics covered by our
questionnaire) and the problem of common-method bias derived from using only
one data source. Thus, we applied N-Bias techniques and common method basis and
restriction-of-range biases tests proposed by Rogelberg and Stanton (2007) and
Table 1 Confirmatory factor analysis
Construct
(N = 164)
Scale items Standardized
factor
loading
t value Average
variance
extracted
Composite
reliability
coefficient
Monitoring I monitor the CEO’s strategic
decision making. [Decision]
.754 – .546 .783
I formally evaluate the CEO’s
performance. [Performance]
.740 3.771
I try to link the CEO’s
compensation to the firm
performance. [Compensation]
.723 3.160
Resource
provision
I provided advice and counsel to
the CEO in discussions outside
of board/committee meetings.
[Advice]
.623 – .548 .779
I provide information to the CEO
which I obtained through my
personal networks.
[Information]
.912 5.270
I make my external professional
relationships available to the
CEO. [Relationships]
.660 5.164
Board
interpersonal
justice
They have treated me in a polite
manner. [Board politeness]
.901 – .770 .929
They have treated me with dignity.
[Board dignity]
.932 14.713
They have treated me with respect.
[Board respect]
.960 15.570
They have refrained from
improper remarks or comments.
[Board remarks]
.690 10.126
CEO
interpersonal
justice
He/she has treated me in a polite
manner. [CEO politeness]
.911 – .850 .944
He/she has treated me with
dignity. [CEO dignity]
.962 16.592
He/she has treated me with
respect. [CEO respect]
.890 16.353
Some items were dropped from the original scales for the sake of the validity of the constructs. Addi-
tionally, the item ‘‘How often, on average, do you interact with the CEO outside the boardroom?’’ was
used to proxy Social desirability response bias
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Randall and Fernandes (1991), and followed Podsakoff et al. (2003) by using
Harman’s single factor test and undertaking two different partial correlation
procedures (one for partialling out social desirability response bias—SDRB—and a
second test for partialling out an unrelated market variable, as shown in the next
section). By doing so, we ensured the validity of the conclusions drawn from our
study.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Dependent variables
Monitoring was measured through the first three items shown in Table 1 below.
These items were developed based on the works of Westphal (1999), but adapted for
board members, similarly to Del Brio et al. (2013), and incorporating executive
compensation as an additional dimension (e.g., Tosi and Go´mez-Mejı´a 1994;
Mehran 1995). A representative item of this scale is ‘‘I monitor the CEO’s strategic
decision making [labelled as Decision].’’ The reliability of this measure, as denoted
by Cronbach’s alpha, was acceptable (a = .76). We also adapted from Westphal
(1999) the measure for Resource provision, through the following three items in
Table 1. A representative item of this measure is ‘‘I provided advice and counsel to
the CEO in discussions outside of board/committee meetings [labelled as Advice].’’
The reliability of this measure was also acceptable (a = .76).
3.3.2 Independent variables
On the justice measures, we followed the survey items in prior studies (Bies and
Moag 1986; Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1993). Board interpersonal justice was
measured with the following 4 items in Table 1, a representative item being ‘‘Board
members have treated me with respect [labelled as Board respect].’’ The reliability
of Board interpersonal justice was very high (a = .92). Finally, CEO interpersonal
justice was assessed with 3 items, its reliability being also very high (a = .94). A
representative item is ‘‘The CEO has treated me with respect [labelled as CEO
respect].’’
3.3.3 Control variables
We control for country effects, Firm type, Director tenure and Director education.
On the one hand, since we expect interpersonal justice will vary by country due to
the cultural differences, we need to control for country effects first. Thus, three
dichotomous variables, d1, d2 and d3, were built; where d1 takes the value of 1 for
Canada, and 0 otherwise; d2 takes the value of 1 for Singapore and 0 otherwise, and
finally d3 takes the value of 1 for Spain and 0, otherwise. On the other hand, to
control for Firm type, we used a binary variable, where 1 stands for publicly listed
corporations, and 0 otherwise. We additionally control for Director tenure,
measured as the number of years a director has served for the same board, and for
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Director education, which ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 stands for Bachelor’s degree,
2 stands for Master’s degree and 3 stands for PhD.
As noted above, it was also our main aim to avoid common method biases. For
this purpose, three main tests were performed following Podsakoff et al. (2003).
Two of them (those that meant to build a surrogate for method variance) require two
new variables. The first is the effect of SDRB. For this purpose, we asked
respondents the frequency of their meetings with the CEO outside the board room,
an indirect question to calibrate directors’ independence. However, since the
provision of resources may take place in those additional meetings, there is a trade-
off for directors between a high meeting frequency, which could compromise their
independence, and a low meeting frequency, which may constrain their opportu-
nities to provide resources. This trade-off makes this question a good proxy for
Social desirability response bias, which in turn reduces the effects of restriction-of-
range bias.
In a second step, we need a ‘‘market variable’’ from a different source so as to
partialling out an unrelated ‘‘market’’ variable. For this purpose, we built a variable
that identifies the role of the respondent within the organization, namely, a variable
that indicates whether the director was also the first executive or CEO of the
organization. We built a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case of Duality
(the director is also the CEO) and 0, otherwise to measure this variable.
3.4 Data analysis
The lack of longitudinal data, due to the characteristics of our survey, led us to
choose a methodology based on cross sectional data. Structural Equation Modelling
(SEM) was used to test the hypotheses. We used Partial Least Squares (PLS) rather
than covariance-based SEM. Not only has PLS been used in different sectors and
research settings (Helm 2005; Pavlou and Fygenson 2006; Herna´ndez-Maestro and
Gonza´lez-Benito 2014), but also one feature of this research makes PLS
appropriate: Our data set includes different types of variables (including dichoto-
mous ones), and PLS can estimate both measurement and structural parameters
through an iterative process that includes simple and multiple regression by
traditional Ordinary Least Squares. Thus, it avoids distributional assumptions about
the observed variables. The software employed was SmartPLS 3.2.4 (Ringle et al.
2015) and we determined the level of statistical significance of the coefficients
through a bootstrap re-sampling procedure (500 sub-samples, randomly generated).
Traditional parametric tests are inappropriate, because we made no assumption
about the distribution of observable variables.
To test our hypotheses1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, we first run a Confirmatory Factor
Analysis. For each construct, Table 1 shows the standardized factor loading,
t-value, average variance extracted and composite reliability coefficient. With
reference to convergent validity, the t values associated with the coefficients of the
indicators are significant in all cases, so such validity exists. The measure of
discriminant validity first takes into account that the correlations do not surpass the
level of .8. Complementarily, strong condition of discriminant validity is indicated
(Fornell and Larcker 1981), because the average variance extracted for each
E. B. Del Brio et al.
123
construct is greater than the squared correlation between that construct and any
other (Table 2). We also estimated Model 1 for each of the dependent variables:
Monitoring and Resource provision (Fig. 1). Model 1 includes as independent
variables both Board interpersonal justice and CEO interpersonal justice, as well as
the set of control variables. Within this set of control variables, we included three
dummy variables, d1, d2 and d3; where d1 takes the value of 1 for Canada, and 0
otherwise; d2 takes the value of 1 for Singapore and 0 otherwise, and finally d3
takes the value of 1 for Spain and 0, otherwise. We leave out d2 to avoid the dummy
trap problem.
Even though we controlled for country effects, the estimation of Model 1 cannot
provide us with information on the different patterns in board behaviors (i.e.,
Monitoring and Resource provision) for each country, hypothesized in H3a, H3b
and H4a, H4b. To test these hypotheses, a second estimation, Model 2, is presented.
For this model, we considered the split level as the median value of the
individualism index. Singapore and Spain are hence grouped together representing
low individualistic countries and, Canada (d1) representing high individualistic
countries. Therefore, Model 2 includes the whole set of independent variables and
the interaction effect of one of the three different dummies (d1). The results of the
effect of the interaction effects can be interpreted as the amount that should be
added to the effect of the predictor when we pass from d2 ? d3 (Singapore and
Spain) to d1 (Canada). Model 2, by running a single analysis for each dependent
variable, shows several advantages. First, it does not require the disaggregation of
the data by country, which would motivate an excessive atomization of the sample,
and consequently a reduction in the statistical power of our analysis. Therefore, the
caveat of a low rate of response can be somewhat addressed since we avoid
methodologies that may exacerbate its problem.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between both dependent variables and the
entire set of independent variables for the entire sample. As this table shows, there
are no significant correlations among the variables. We also checked variance
Table 2 Discriminant validity
Monitoring Resource
provision
Board interpersonal
justice
CEO interpersonal
justice
Monitoring .54
Resource provision .010 .55
Board interpersonal justice .064 .052 .77
CEO interpersonal justice .019 .048 .075 .85
Diagonal shows average variance extracted for each construct. Squared correlations are shown below the
diagonal
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inflation factors (VIF) for each variable and did not find values of VIF larger than 10
(rule of thumb commonly used to identify serious multicollinearity); most values are
below 2. Thus, we conclude that multicollinearity is not a major problem for this
study.
As to the common method bias tests, Harman’s test results were satisfactory,
indicating that the variance of the model was not explained by a single factor but by
up to 4 different factors. We also partialled out Social desirability response bias and
.749*
Board
interpersonal justice 
CEO 
interpersonal 
justice
.234**
-.020
.284**
Monitoring
Board politeness
Board dignity
Board respect
Board remarks
CEO politeness
CEO dignity Decision
-.055
CEO respect
.964**
.951**
.951**
.941**
.791**
.940**
.139* .801** .583**
.117†
Performance Compensation
.098
.208**
-.039
R2=.237
Q2=.095
SRMR=.074
.939**
d1 (Canada)
d3 (Spain)
Firm type
Director tenure
Director 
education
SDRB
Duality
Board 
interpersonal 
justice
-.012
CEO 
interpersonal 
justice
Resource 
provision
.212*
.151†
.270**
.158†
.165*
-.013
.204†
Board politeness
Board dignity
Board respect
Board remarks
CEO politeness
CEO dignity Advice
Information Relationships
CEO respect
.008
.830**
.954**
.954**
.941*
.978*
.917*
.873** .766**
.927**
R2=.154
Q2=.062
SRMR=.038
.767**
d1 (Canada)
d3 (Spain)
Firm type
Director tenure
Director 
education
SDRB
Duality
.939**
Squared CEO 
interpers. justice
1.032*
.748*
Board 
interpersonal justice
.104
CEO 
interpersonal 
justice
Monitoring
.283**
.177*
-.992*
-.058
.149*
.106†
.003
Board politeness
Board dignity
Board respect
Board remarks
CEO politeness
CEO dignity Decision
Performance Compensation
CEO respect
.195**
.773**
.964**
.950**
.952**
.941**
.821** .575**
.940**
R2=.267
Q2=.103
SRMR=.072
d1 (Canada)
d3 (Spain)
Firm type
Director tenure
Director 
education
SDRB
Duality
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 Results for Model 1 (standardized coefficients). **, *, Significance at the 99, 95 and 90%
confidence level, respectively
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the selected market variable (Duality of the director) as surrogates of common
method variance, compared the model with and without these variables, and
detected that the structural parameters among the rest of the variables/constructs in
the model were not affected.
For each model the following indicators are provided as measures of the
predictive and model fit quality: R2, Q2 and the Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR). Q2 values larger than 0 indicate that the exogenous constructs
have predictive relevance for the endogenous constructs under consideration.
SRMR measures the squared discrepancy between the observed correlations and the
model-implied correlations, as a means to validate a model (Henseler et al. 2014).
Although widely-accepted threshold values have not been derived yet for SRMR,
following a conservative approach, SRMR values below .08 would indicate good fit
(Hair et al. 2017).
Figure 1 shows the results of SEM analysis for Model 1 for both Monitoring and
Resource provision as dependent variables. It shows that Board interpersonal
justice is positively and significantly related to both Monitoring and Resource
provision, supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Figure 1 also indicates that CEO
interpersonal justice is positively and significantly associated with Resource
provision, but no significant effect of CEO interpersonal justice is found for
Monitoring, supporting Hypothesis 2a, but not 2b. Thus, all but one of our
predictions on the main effects of Board interpersonal justice and CEO
interpersonal justice on the director’s boardroom behaviors are supported. The
effect of the two dummies (country effect) in Fig. 1 should be interpreted as the
added effect on Monitoring or Resource provision, when we pass from the one that
is excluded, d2 (Singapore), to the one in the model (Hair et al. 2010: 177–178).
There are differences among countries regarding their direct effect on Monitoring or
Resource provision. That is, compared to d2 (Singapore), d1 (Canada) indicates a
greater direct positive effect on Monitoring and Resource provision. Moreover, d3
(Spain) vs. d2 (Singapore) also entails a greater direct positive effect on Resource
provision, but not on Monitoring, for which d3 (Spain) direct effect is non-
significant.
Regarding the control variables, three of them (Firm type, Director tenure,
Director education) exert a positive effect on Monitoring. Being a publicly listed
corporation, greater number of years that the director has been on the same board,
and higher level of his/her education, are all positively related to Monitoring. But
for Resource provision, from these three control variables, only Firm type shows a
significant positive direct effect. Finally, although Duality (the role of the Director
as a CEO) has no significant effect on Monitoring or Resource provision, SDRB has
a significant effect (90% confidence level) on Resource provision.
Due to the unexpected relationship for CEO interpersonal justice, which seemed
not to be significantly related to Monitoring, we went deeper into the analysis and
explored the possibility of the existence of a quadratic relationship between CEO
interpersonal justice and Monitoring. Two reasons motivated us to explore this
relationship. First, the careful examination of a scatter plot suggested a non-linear
relationship, and second, the fact that the existence of a quadratic relationship could
be uncovered as a non-significant relationship when the quadratic factor is not
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included in the model. For these reasons, we tested a new version of Model 1 for the
case in which the dependent variable was Monitoring, where we included the square
term of CEO interpersonal justice and called this Model 1b. Model 1b produced
interesting results; we detected the existence of a non-linear relationship between
CEO interpersonal justice and Monitoring. The relationship is negative at low levels
of CEO interpersonal justice and turns to positive at very high levels of CEO
interpersonal justice (Fig. 1b). The rest of the results remained unchanged.
Figure 2 shows the results of the interaction model (Model 2) for both
Monitoring and Resource provision as dependent variables. Again, the effect of the
interaction variable should be interpreted as the added effect to that of the
independent variable (Board interpersonal justice or CEO interpersonal justice) on
the dependent one (Monitoring or Resource provision). As for the country effects of
Board interpersonal justice, we found that Board interpersonal justice is
significantly and less strongly related to Monitoring or Resource provision for
Canada, the more individualistic country, than for Singapore and Spain grouped
together. These results support Hypotheses 3a and 3b, which predict that Board
interpersonal justice has less effect in the individualistic country. The figure also
shows that CEO interpersonal justice is, as expected, more related to Resource
provision in Canada (the more individualistic country) than in Singapore and Spain.
It also shows that there are no significant differences among the three countries
regarding the effect of CEO interpersonal justice on Monitoring (please note that
congruently with Model 1b, again in Model 2 the square term of CEO interpersonal
justice has been included for the case of Monitoring; however, the effect of the
interaction terms is not significant either for the square term of CEO interpersonal
justice). Hence, Hypothesis 4b is supported, but no support is found for Hypothesis
d1*CEO
d1*Squared CEO 
interpers. justice
Board respect
.753**
Board 
interpersonal 
justice
.092
CEO 
interpersonal 
justice
Monitoring
.686
.268**
-1.057*
-.055
-.831†
.109†
1.058*
Board politeness
Board dignity
Board remarks
CEO politeness
CEO dignity Decision
Performance Compensation
CEO respect
.804**
.939**
.963**
.953*
.950*
.940*
.756** .639**
.939**
Squared CEO 
interpers. justice
R2=.275
Q2=.096
SRMR=.065
d1*Board
.093†
.184*
.773
-.382
d1 (Canada)
Firm type
Director 
tenure
Director 
education
SDRB
Duality
Board respect
.767**
Board 
interpersonal 
justice
-.025
CEO 
interpersonal 
justice
Resource 
provision
.516
.297**
.078
.157†
.629†
.144†
-.992†
Board politeness
Board dignity
Board remarks
CEO politeness
CEO dignity Advice
Information Relationships
CEO respect
.811**
.954**
.954**
.940**
.977**
.921**
.876** .788**
.927**
d1*Board
R2=.155
Q2=.057
SRMR=.034
d1*CEO
-.036
.003
d1 (Canada)
Firm type
Director 
tenure
Director 
education
SDRB
Duality
Fig. 2 Results for Model 2 (standardized coefficients). **, *, Significance at the 99, 95 and 90%
confidence level, respectively
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4a, since no effect for Monitoring is detected. Overall, all of our hypotheses related
to cultural differences among countries, except Hypothesis 4a, are supported.
Table 4 shows a summary of results regarding models. These results are robust
for both Hofstede’s cultural measures and House et al. (2004). Although results for
the latter are not displayed for the sake of brevity, they draw the identical
conclusions.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we used social exchange theory and the concept of justice to explain
board members’ behaviors in terms of their monitoring of and the resource
provision to the CEO. Our findings show that interpersonal justice is indeed an
important predictor of the director’s boardroom behaviors. We found that both
board and CEO interpersonal justice is positively related to resource provision, as
predicted, and board interpersonal justice is also positively related to monitoring.
Although the results for CEO interpersonal justice did not hold at the outset, we
found significant results when we considered a non-linear relationship; CEO
interpersonal justice negatively affects monitoring at low levels, and the relationship
becomes positive at high levels of CEO interpersonal justice.
Table 4 Results summary (standardized coefficients)
Independent variables Monitoring Resource provision
Model 1a Model 1ba Model 2b Model 1a Model 2b
Board interpersonal justice .234** .177* .268** .151 .297**
CEO interpersonal justice -.020 -.992* -1.057* .270** .078
d1: Canada .284** .283** .686 .212* .516
d2: Singapore – – – – –
d3: Spain -.055 .003 – .204 –
Firm type .139* .149* .109 .165* .144
Director tenure .117 .106 .093 -.013 -.036
Director education .208** .195** .184* .008 .003
Social desirability response bias (SDRB) -.039 -.058 -.055 .158 .157
Duality .098 .104 .092 -.012 -.025
Squared CEO interpersonal justice – 1.032* 1.058* – –
d1*Board – – -.831 – -.992
d1*CEO – – .773 – .629
d1*Squared CEO interpersonal justice – – -.382 – –
R2 .237 .267 .275 .154 .155
**, *,  Significance at the 99, 95 and 90% confidence level, respectively
a d2 (Singapore) is left out to avoid the dummy trap problem
b d2 (Singapore) ? d3 (Spain) are left out (vs. d1 (Canada), Canada is the more individualistic country)
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It is, however, also possible that no support for Hypothesis 2b is driven by the
fact that aggregation of the three countries cancel out different effects among those
countries between individualism and collectivism, which supports our approach to
examine cross-cultural differences. Our findings still generally suggest that a board
member who is treated with respect by other board members and the CEO likely has
higher incentives to fulfill his or her board duties, both monitoring the CEO and
providing resources.
On the overall results of the main effects, one could argue that there are
differences between board interpersonal justice and CEO interpersonal justice in
terms of their effects on directors’ behaviors because the source of board
interpersonal justice is the board itself as a group and the source of CEO
interpersonal justice is the CEO as an individual. Our findings, however, show that
regardless of the source of interpersonal justice, board members’ emphasis on
monitoring and resource provision behaviors will be enhanced. This suggests that
interpersonal justice increases a director’s motivation to engage in his or her board
duties of monitoring and resource provision.
Our results on the cross-national comparison between Canada, Singapore, and
Spain reveal that the effects of interpersonal justice vary by country as consistent with
our predictions. These countries share some similarities such as the legal framework of
corporate governance and ownership structure characterized by relatively high
concentration (Garcia-Castro and Aguilera 2012; Morck et al. 2005; Tsui-Auch 2012)
and yet, cultural characteristics in various dimensions including individualism/col-
lectivism are quite different; high individualism in Canada, high collectivism in
Singapore, and moderate collectivism in Spain compared to Canada. Our findings
indicate that CEO interpersonal justice is more positively associated with resource
provision for directors in Canada than in Singapore and Spain, supporting the
argument that individuals in a highly individualistic culture emphasize fair treatment
by other individuals. Also, we found that board interpersonal justice is more strongly
associated with monitoring and resource provision for directors in Singapore and
Spain, the more collectivistic countries, than in Canada. This is consistent with the
view that individuals in more collectivistic or less individualistic cultures (compared
to North Americans) tend to be more sensitive about how they are treated by their
group members. These findings suggest that interpersonal justice has different effects
on directors in different cultures and contexts.
Interestingly, we did not find a stronger negative relationship between CEO
interpersonal justice and monitoring for directors in the case of Canada.
Complementarily, provided the u-shaped effect that CEO interpersonal justice has
on monitoring, no stronger positive effect is found in Canada either, for great values
of CEO interpersonal justice. One possible explanation for this result is that the
board norm in Canadian organizations expects directors to engage in monitoring,
which is the board’s primary function, and thus interpersonal factors have little
influence on their monitoring behavior.
One of the important contributions of this study is that to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that examines the effects of interpersonal justice on
directors’ behaviors in the boardroom in different cultural contexts. We thus
contribute to the comparative corporate governance literature by showing that
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cultural differences affect directors’ behaviors and the perceptions of interpersonal
justice have differential effects on the intensity of their monitoring and resource
provision. While there are prior studies that examine the impact of culture on
governance practices within a firm and on governance system at the national level
(Buck and Shahrim 2005; Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Licht et al. 2005; Tosi and
Greckhamer 2004), there is little research that investigates how individual board
members behave differently in different cultural contexts. Our study fills this gap. In
addition, our study makes a modest contribution to cross-cultural justice research.
As Li and Cropanzano (2009) point out, there is little cross-cultural research on
interpersonal justice. We have specifically focused on cross-cultural differences in
interpersonal justice in a very unique setting, the board of directors, and shown that
the different sources of justice, i.e., other board members and the CEO, have
different effects in different cultural contexts.
One of the important managerial implications is that how an individual board
member perceives other board members’ fair treatment toward each other can affect
how much effort he or she expends in fulfilling the board duties especially in more
collectivistic or less individualistic cultures. Our findings suggest the importance of
the board environment and interpersonal relationships for effective functioning of
individual directors in certain contexts. Another implication is that while CEO
interpersonal justice does not seem to have stronger negative effect on directors’
monitoring in Canada, it has greater positive impact on their resource provision,
which implies that how the CEO treats board members affects the extent of advice
and counselling that he or she can obtain from them. This means that for the CEO to
take full advantage of the board capital or resources that the board has, his or her
interpersonal relationship with board members is quite important.
This study also has an implication on corporate governance regulations and
harmonization of corporate governance rules across countries. There is a greater
attention globally on expertise and professional experience of outside directors who are
expected to play a managerial monitoring role using such director capital. However,
while rich director capital may be helpful in fulfilling their board duties, how they
actually behave in the boardroom is heavily influenced by culture because the board
functions as a group and how members interact with each other who often, if not always,
share the same culture affects board dynamics and ultimately behavior of individual
directors. Our results suggest that board interpersonal justice has greater effects in more
collectivistic countries implying that interpersonal factors have varying effects in
different countries. This suggests that while corporate governance regulations are
becoming increasingly similar in different countries, it is also important to look at their
characteristics such as their justice behavior because it likely impacts group dynamics
and individual directors’ behavior, especially in more collectivistic countries.
The majority of corporate governance research has been heavily influenced by
agency theory, which focuses on the board’s monitoring function. Because this
theoretical perspective was initially developed in an impersonal context in the
contractual relationship between shareholders and management (Eisenhardt 1989),
interpersonal perceptions such as justice among directors as well as between CEO
and directors have been neglected by corporate governance researchers. While there
have been recent attempts to incorporate such factors as social and friendship ties
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between CEO and the board (McDonald and Westphal 2003; Westphal 1999;
Westphal and Khanna 2003), those studies do not specifically address how
directors’ personal perceptions affect their behaviors. We have shown that
interpersonal justice perceptions play an important role in shaping behaviors of
directors in the boardroom. These relationships and the resultant behaviors have
important implications for board effectiveness and organizational performance.
This study examines the importance of interpersonal justice perceptions in
predicting two elements of board member performance; monitoring and resource
provision. Some limitations must be acknowledged, although we have taken as
many corrections as possible to ensure that they do not affect the validity of our
findings and conclusions. First, our study relied on self-reported data. However, it
should be noted that the board members’ perceptions of the CEO’s behavior would
be difficult for a third party to assess. Second, our data was not longitudinal, which
prevents us from making more definite claims about the causal relations between the
variables. Third, we deal with a low rate of response, although we have applied
robust tests and mechanisms in order to reduce the impact of common method bias
and to prevent a substantive impact of a low response rate on the conclusions drawn
from our study. However, we should emphasize the difficulty of surveying active
members of boards of directors; this population is limited in number, busy, and not
always motivated to complete surveys, even for academic research.
Future research can build on this work by examining potential antecedents and
moderators of this relationship. For example, social ties (Granovetter 1973;
Westphal 1999) between a board member and the CEO may reduce the board
member’s likelihood of monitoring, and they may cause the CEO to treat the board
member with greater interpersonal justice, thereby increasing the board member’s
likelihood of providing resources. Whereas this study has focused on the role of
interpersonal justice, it would be interesting to examine other important social
exchange factors. For instance, future research may investigate the role of
informational justice (Masterson et al. 2000), especially in a board member’s
relationship with the CEO, in predicting board members’ behaviors.
Future research can also extend this study by including directors from other
countries. While we believe that the three countries examined in this study clearly have
different cultural characteristics, we need to investigate other countries from different
cultures in order to more deeply understand the effects of culture and institutions on
director’s behaviors. Further, governance environment of each country or context may
also have influence how board members behave in the boardroom. It is likely that the
governance environment has some effects in shaping the board norm. The overall
quality of corporate governance may have some impact on what the board does and
what board members do. For example, based on one assessment of the quality of
corporate governance, Canada and Singapore are ranked high while Spain is ranked
relatively lower compared to these countries (GMI 2010). It would be thus interesting
to examine the relationship between the quality of corporate governance of each
country and directors’ behaviors and expected roles.
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